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A NEED FOR CONTINUING
EDUCATION IN JUDICIAL ETHICS
HOWARD T. MARKEY"
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges-both experienced and inexperienced-need continuing education in
judicial ethics. Judges need to be educated about judicial ethics upon first taking
the bench, and they also need to be reminded of and brought up-to-date about
judicial ethics while they remain on the bench.' Further, judges need to be
educated about judicial ethics at seminars or conferences, not only to learn the
rules of judicial ethics and the application of the rules, but also to get
reinforcement in ethical conduct from their fellow judges. Education about
judicial ethics would benefit judges individually and collectively. Seminars on
judicial ethics would provide a means by which judges, through exchange of
ideas and experience, could anticipate and resolve the many and ever-increasing
ethical challenges confronting judges.
II. JuiGs AND ETHICS
Unlike judges in other nations, judges in the United States learn the art of
judging, for the most part, through on-the-job training Unlike judges in Great
Britain who are selected from barristers who have spent their professional lives
in the courts and Inns, judges in the United States may be elected or appointed
° Dean and Professor, The John Marshall Law School; former Chair of the American Inns of
Court; former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit; former Chair of the Advisory
Committee of Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
1. As to the need to educate judges about judicial ethics when they first take the bench, see
Howard T. Markey, A Judicial Need for the 80's: Schooling in Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L. REv.
417 (1987). As to the need to continue to educate judges about judicial ethics, I have addressed this
issue many times over the years at seminars and conferences. The need still exists and will continue
to exist.
2. Judges may receive schooling in the art of judging or the law at law schools, such as the
masters program at the University of Virginia Law School; the National Judicial College in Reno,
Nevada for state judges; the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. for federal judges; or at
mandated judicial conferences for federal judges (see 28 U.S.C. 28, §§ 331, 333) or state judges
such as those in Illinois (see ILL. CONST. arts. 6, 17) or Indiana (see IND. CODE § 33-13-14-1
(1988)). Illinois at one time required all of its judges to attend a half-day session on judicial ethics
at its annual judicial conference. It later required ethical issues to be presented pervasively in
sessions on substantive and procedural law at the conferences. Recently Illinois switched from an
annual conference for all its judges to regional conferences.
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from diverse professional backgrounds, often with limited courtroom
experience. 3 Once on the bench, a judge has much to learn about the art of
judging. A judge must master both substantive and procedural law.4 But there
are practical constraints. A judge may have a heavy caseload that requires
managing a calendar involving diverse cases. A judge may at any time hear
cases ranging from a simple contract case to a highly complex commercial class
action. Some judges, by reason of locale or the assignment system, may be
forced to be competent generalists in an area of the law that is considered by the
practicing bar to be a specialty.5 A judge must be an expert in procedure and
evidence. In addition, most judges have administrative duties and committee
assignments.
Many judges take the bench without education in professional ethics other
than a course in law school.6 The volume and diversity of cases leaves most
judges little time to contemplate judicial ethics. The immediacy of managing
and resolving cases, rather than a lack of concern about judicial ethics, limits
time spent contemplating judicial ethics. Thus, a judge often is faced with
ethical issues that pop up unexpectedly and unhappily like some evil genie.
Without a sound education in judicial ethics, a judge may not timely recognize
the ethical issue or be fully equipped to handle it effectively. Indeed, "[j]udges
today are under increased pressure to discern proper ethical conduct not only in
all of their judicial and extra-judicial activities, but also with respect to the
activities of their families. ,7
3. On the whole, judges in the United States do remarkably well in the art of judging. This
is a tribute to the judges themselves and the law schools that educate them.
4. Judges in our adversary system should comfortably rely on counsel in presenting the issues
and the applicable law fully and fairly. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1990) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Signing Pleadings, Motions and Other
Papers. Unfortunately experience teaches that judges cannot take too much comfort in some
adversarial presentations.
5. As to locale, rural judges may face different problems in application of judicial ethics than
urban judges. Thirteenth National College Involves Judges and Conduct Commissioners, JUD.
CONDUCT REP., Fall 1992, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Thirteenth National College]. See In re Haddad, 627
P.2d 221, 231 (Ariz. 1981), in which the court that censured a judge observed:
We are also aware that in a small precinct such as respondent's, many if not most
of the people who appear before the court are well known to the judge. This puts strong
and at times seemingly unfair pressure on the justice of the peace in discharging his
duties, especially just before the election.
As to specialty, a patent case is tried before a federal district court judge who is a generalist but
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, inter alia, a court specializing in patent
cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
6. Judges, however, are expected to be knowledgeable in the rules of judicial ethics on taking
the bench. Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 630 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1981); In re Seal,
585 So. 2d 741, 746 (Miss. 1991).
7. Thirteenth National College, supra note 5, at 6.
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Many states have adopted the 1990 American Bar Association Code of
Judicial Conduct." The Code mandates judges to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary; to avoid impropriety and appearance of
impropriety; and to be impartial and diligent. It also requires judges to conduct
themselves in their extra-judicial activities so as to minimize the risk of conflict
with judicial obligations. Finally, it restricts judges from inappropriate political
activity. The Code instructs judges in their ethical obligations in general
directive statements. It obviously leaves application of these statements to
particular fact situations, first to the judge faced with an ethical issue, then to
the courts and boards. Nevertheless, because the Code is intended to guide
conduct, the terms of the Code could be discussed among judges at conferences
so as to minimize the risk that ethical issues would arise unexpectedly and in
unhappy circumstances.
The Judicial Discipline and Disability Digest published by the American
Judicature Society catalogues the opinions of courts and boards on judicial
ethics. It is an excellent resource for judges faced with ethical issues. It
catalogues the opinions involving substantive conduct by breach ofjudicial duties
and the extra-judicial activity that constitutes a breach of the canons. The
reported opinions, particularly those in which a violation of a rule was found,
are instructive. They are instructive as a guide to ethical judicial conduct, the
broad and varied range of ethical issues judges face, and the need for seminars
on judicial ethics.
Seminars in judicial ethics would benefit judges in two ways. First,
seminars would educate judges in the rules of judicial ethics and their
application. Second, seminars would allow judges to exchange their thoughts
on and experiences with ethical issues. Education in the rules and their
application would arm the judges with knowledge of the rules and would make
colleagues available as resources for judges who are faced with ethical issues in
the future. Also, the exchanges that take place in a seminar might provide
examples of ethical ideals and conduct that would deter unethical conduct.
Despite seminars on judicial ethics, a few judges may be uneducable. The
only solution for these few may be removal from the bench for willful or
8. For example, both Illinois and Indiana have adopted the Code. See Cynthia Gray, 1990ABA
Model Code Adoption Update, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Summer 1993, at 4, 5 (Illinois); Cynthia Gray,
1990 ABA Model Code Adoption Update, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1993, at 1, 7 (Indiana). The
Reporter regularly identifies the states that have adopted the Code, amendments to the Code, and
variations to the Code particular to different states. Curiously, unlike rules governing the
professional conduct of lawyers that now abandon "the appearance of impropriety," the Code still
emphasizes that judges shall avoid conduct that gives the "appearance of impropriety." MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
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knowing violation of judicial ethics.9 Of these, some may have been corrupted
by financial greed, lust for power, or excessive self-righteousness."0 Others
may have succumbed to misplaced loyalty or concern for family or friends."
But even those judges who were corrupted or who succumbed to temptation
might have been guided, helped, or saved by meeting ethical colleagues at
seminars whom they could model their conduct after or call on for assistance or
advice when tempted.
Rather than willful or knowing violations, most judges who violate judicial
ethics do so through inadvertence due to pressure of time, failure to recognize
the ethical issue, or even from ignorance of rules of judicial ethics. Obviously
inadvertence or ignorance of the rules is not an excuse.' 2 However, mandatory
seminars on judicial ethics would provide judges with the needed time to quietly
think about ethical issues and to learn the rules of judicial ethics and their
application. Time to quietly think about judicial ethics and knowledge of the
rules would go a long way in benefitting judges individually and collectively in
9. In In re Anderson, 451 So. 2d 232 (Miss. 1984), the court explained "willful misconduct":
Willful misconduct in office is the improper or wrongful use of the power of his
office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross unconcern for his conduct and
generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of
diligence. Necessarily, the term would encompass conduct involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption, and also any knowing misuse of the office, whatever the
motive. However, these elements are not necessary to a finding of bad faith. A specific
intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge
knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority
constitutes bad faith ....
Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. However, a judge
may also, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a
manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into
disrepute ....
Id. at 234.
10. See BROCKTON LOCKWOOD, OPERATION GREYLORD: BROCKTON LOCKWOOD'S STORY (So.
I. U. Press 1990) (discussing Illinois state judges from Cook County who took bribes to fix cases);
Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983) (describing a judge
apparently intoxicated with power); In re Boles, 555 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (Ind. 1990) (describing the
respondent judge as being "both blessed and cursed with an advanced case of self-righteousness,"
after the respondent wrote a letter of apology recognizing his egregious misconduct).
11. See In re Haddad, 627 P.2d 221 (Ariz. 1981); In re Sauce, 561 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. 1990).
See also Darlene Ricker, A Car Crash Leads to Ethics Clash: Santa Barbara Firms Shun Lawyer
Who Filed Suit Against Son of Protesting Judge, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 30, in which a judge wrote
to a firm on a judicial letterhead expressing "concern" that he might have to pay damages to the
firm's associate's wife in excess of insurance coverage in a personal injury action brought by the
wife against the judge's son.
12. In re Haddad, 627 P.2d at 232; In re Lewis, 535 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. 1989) (describing
the respondent judge as "totally unaware of his professional obligation"); In re Bailey, 541 So. 2d
1036, 1040 (Miss. 1989).
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a most important aspect of the art of judging.
Ill. JUSTIFICATION-THE JUDGE 13
Continuing education in judicial ethics for all judges is justified by the
nature of the subject and its importance to each judge. Ethics cannot be
separated from the art of judging. It is its very soul. No one respects the
unethical, and respect is the lifeblood of the judge qua judge. Abject servility
to the person of the judge is an anathema, but respect for the judicial office and
for the judge as judge is critical to the operation of our legal system.
Public confidence in the judiciary is the source of a judge's power. Public
confidence in turn rests on respect. But respect does not come with the
territory, or with the titles "Judge" or "Your Honor," or with the robe, or with
the bench. Those are but symbols-important symbols-but symbols only.
They are loaned to the judge while he or she holds the office they symbolize.
They are not substitutes. Respect cannot be merely donned, or ordered, or
bought, or assumed. Nor can respect for long be simply granted. Respect must
be, and can only be, earned, and only the ethical can earn respect.
One could point to many examples to show that we are living in an era of
confused values, what some have called an ethical crisis. New situations arise
in all areas of society that require constant reexamination of ethical constraints.
The judiciary is not immune to this process. Judges need to continually discuss
and evaluate their role and conduct. Many aspects of the old "Justice of the
Peace" system that flourished not so long ago in the United States, when justices
of the peace were paid by a percentage of the fines they imposed, are now
looked upon as manifestly unethical. Self-examination is a never-ending
process.
Ethics viewed as a matter of conscience, or as Albert Schweitzer's concern
for others, can be taught.'4 Judges can be taught to recognize the ethical
13. I repeat in the following paragraphs my thoughts and words from previous articles and
speeches. See, e.g., Markey, supra note 1, which represented my thoughts in the 1980s. I believe
those thoughts are at least as valid today as they were then.
14. See, e.g., ALBERT SCHWEITZER, REVERENCE FOR LIFE (Reginald H. Fuller trans., Harper
& Row 1969) (originally published in German in 1966). Schweitzer has written:
Morality requires that people we don't know should not be considered as strangers.
That applies equally to those who are worse than strangers to us, because we feel an
aversion toward them or because they have shown hostility to us. Even such people we
must treat as our friends.... [No one is a stranger to you; every man's welfare is your
concern. We so often take for granted that some people are our immediate concern
while others are a matter of indifferences to us. Clearly this natural feeling is not
permitted by ethical standards.... [Tihe most elementary ethical principle ... means
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content of contemplated conduct and subtle, obscured conflicts of interest.
Judges must continuously examine the ethics-intensive situations that confront
them and the competing considerations involved in meeting and handling those
situations. This examination will help judges more easily evaluate their role and
conduct, whether or not objections are raised by litigants or members of the
press or general public.
There are ways to earn respect. There are also ways, most often
inadvertent, to lose or diminish respect. Judges who constantly reexamine their
ethical alarm system will be ahead of the game. Continuing education injudicial
ethics will benefit all judges, whether local, state or federal,15 and in the end
will benefit the public and the legal system itself.
IV. JUSTIFICATION-THE JUDICIARY
The second justification for continuing ethical education is its effect on the
judiciary as an institution. The concern is institutional and not just individual.
It is not enough, in the public eye, that there be a high standard of ethics
exhibited by most judges in the judiciary-there must be an excellence of ethics
exhibited by all judges.
No institution, judicial or otherwise, has ethics-only people have ethics.
People who are judges cannot take refuge in the knowledge that they do nothing
wrong. They are part of an institution. When one judge does wrong, this
reflects on the institution and ultimately on the public's perception of the
integrity of each individual judge.
The public does not see, or see very much of, what a judge qua judge does
every day. Even the work of trial judges, who are on the front lines, is seen by
fewer than all the people, and they see only the in-court work of the judge.
Even then, busy judges may tend to forget that the judicial process is
mysterious, secretive, confusing, and illogical to the litigants it exists to serve.
Judges today are just too pressed to enjoy the gift described by Burns-"to see
ourselves as others see us." 6 On the other hand, the people do see judges'
every apparent or real ethical infraction, and if they do not, the media will show
it to them.
that ... we must never consider ourselves strangers toward any human being.
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
15. To the litigant seeking justice and to the public, who either give or withhold respect, the
source of the judge's compensation is and whether the judge is elected or appointed are irrelevant.
16. ROBERT BURNS, To a Louse, in POEMS AND SONGS OF ROBERT BURNS 137 (James Barke
ed., 1960) (1786).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/6
1994] CONTINUING EDUCATION 653
Compliance with a high standard of judicial ethics is the primary element
in the pursuit of a judiciary seen by the public as worthy of its confidence. To
meet that standard, every judge must always remember that ethics and the
appearance of ethics, like justice and the appearance of justice, are inseparable.
The requirement is for a constant, pervading realization that each judge must not
only be ethical, but must appear to be ethical, not only on the bench, but off,
not only as a judge, but as a person. For it is not the judges' perception that
counts, nor the judges' confidence in their own ethical rectitude, nor even the
judges' own sense of logic. In building and maintaining the image of the
judiciary, it is the reasonable perception of the people that counts-and that is
all that counts.
Judges "must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny." 7
Constant reexamination of judicial ethics will help ensure over time the ability
of the judiciary not only to survive but to welcome happily that public scrutiny.
Indeed, a judiciary armored with a strong reputation for ethical conduct can
withstand attacks from any quarter.
It would be nice if the media were to tell the public frequently of the high
level of ethics maintained daily by the vast majority ofjudges. That is not going
to happen. Nonetheless, by maintaining a high level of judicial ethics and by
constantly working to raise it even higher, the judiciary as an institution and
judges individually will benefit.
V. JUSTIFICATION-RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A third justification lies in the need for further development of the subject
matter.
There is much room for research and development in the field of judicial
ethics. Judicial ethics cannot be viewed as a mechanical or mathematical set of
plain and easily applied rules. Judicial ethics is too "human" a subject to permit
reliance on a supposedly all-encompassing set of "rules" learnable by rote. In
the vast array of actions a judge might take, there are too many nuances, too
many variables, and too many factual combinations to warrant the view that the
Code of Conduct for Judges supplies a complete "handle" on all that is
encompassed by the phrase "judicial ethics."
Ethical principles, like all true principles, may themselves be immutable
17. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, cmt 1 (1990). The ancient root of the
commentary is reflected in the 18th century lectures of Justice James Wilson, "a judge is the blessing
or he is the curse of society. His powers are important: his character and conduct can never be
objects of indifference." 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 158 (J.D. Andrews ed., 1896).
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and unchallengeable. It is in their application to specific conduct that
discomforting issues are presented and training is needed. The need for value
trade-offs, many unforeseen when codes and rules are adopted, arises when the
judge must match an ethical principle with contemplated conduct. The need to
reexamine these situations is on-going and a structured continuing education
program on judicial ethics would be helpful.
The practical questions raised by experienced judges in a continuing
education program will be helpful in refining the nuances implicit in any system
of judicial ethics. The subject is not purely academic. The practical problems
that judges encounter change over time. It is crucial that new judges be exposed
to the ethical problems that they will, in all likelihood, encounter on and off the
bench. It is also crucial that there be a forum where experienced judges can get
together on a regular basis to discuss new ethical developments and problems.
Their shared experiences will provide a solid basis for refining and embellishing
present standards and for setting an agenda on ethics in the future.
VI. MATrERs OF CONCERN
There are concerns that must be continuously addressed in a seminar on
judicial ethics. These concerns are reflected in the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct. The ABA resolution involves a never-ending balancing process that
affects each judge.
A. Independence vs. Accountability
How does one reconcile the need for judges to be independent in their
decision-making with the need for accountability? Judges are not truly
independent if they are not ethical. Yet an ethical norm needs to be enforced.
How can the public hold a judge accountable for his or her conduct while
assuring the judge the essential freedom to render independent decisions?
B. Isolation vs. Involvement
The thrust of much of the Code, advisory opinions, and court opinions
dealing with judicial ethics, is toward more and more isolation of the judge and
the judge's family from community affairs. Paradoxically, judges are being
asked to decide more and more questions that involve the management of
society. How does a judge keep a finger on the pulse of society without
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becoming such an active participant that his or her integrity is compromised?'
C. Presumptions-Impartiality vs. Partiality
There is today no public presumption that judges can be impartial.19 But
how far can this be pushed and does it affect the judge's self-image? We may
not want to put judges on a pedestal, but we want to ensure that they are
accorded the proper measure of respect necessary for them to function
effectively.
D. Appearance vs. Reality
Appearances are as important as reality when it comes to judicial ethics.
Nonetheless, harried, harassed, and hurried, a judge may see only the real,
unaware that appearances may be quite different. Schooling in judicial ethics
must ensure that ethical judicial conduct is so clothed as to make it appear in its
true ethical colors.
VII. THE NEED FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION
There has been an ever increasing public awareness of judicial ethics in the
last thirty or so years. In 1974, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges and reformed its Advisory
Committee on the Code. In 1981, Congress passed the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, creating a mechanism for
receipt and investigation of complaints about behavior of federal judges. All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have created permanent bodies to
receive and investigate complaints about behavior of state judges. The American
Inns of Court, a flourishing group, was established in part to provide a vehicle
for communication between and among judges and lawyers about professional
concerns. The American Judicature Society has created "The Center for Judicial
Conduct Organizations," which conducts conferences and workshops and
publishes the Judicial Conduct Reporter, the Judicial Discipline and Disability
Digest, and other publications. Numerous articles on the subject have been
written.
18. "In the eighteenth century, it was complained that the bench was occupied by 'legal monks,
utterly ignorant of human nature and of the affairs of men'." Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissadsfacdon With the Administration of Jusdce, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906) (quoting from 4 LORD
CAMPBELL, LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 119 (3d ed. 1874)).
19. Whether there ever was such a presumption is problematic. What may in the past have
been perceived as such a presumption of public faith may have been mere apathy, or the absence
of television and investigative reporting, or minimal contact with the courts compared with that of
today's litigious society.
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The reason for this public interest is not clear. News stories about judicial
misconduct and the indictment and conviction of some state and federal judges
have undoubtedly made the issue real to many persons. Also, judges have taken
an expanded role in managing our society, and they therefore touch the lives of
many people. A large number of bodies are engaged today in monitoring,
investigating, reporting, and acting on complaints of judicial misconduct.
This is all for the good, and it has not resulted in any serious abridgment
of judicial independence or otherwise harmed the judiciary. However, judges
must be made continually aware of new developments in the area of judicial
ethics and of their practical application.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The state and federal judiciaries are under constant and growing public
scrutiny. Maintenance of the highest standards of judicial ethics is thus more
than ever critical to the judiciary's continued legitimacy and public acceptance.
Mandatory courses in judicial ethics should be instituted and regularly attended
by each judge. Such a course might well aid a judge to recognize and to sail
safely by the shoals of ethical entrapment. The price is small to pay.
As I have said previously, I remember hearing, as a boy, the expression,
"As Sober as a Judge."' Whether pre-schooling in judicial ethics is instituted,
or some other means is adopted to facilitate the efforts ofjudges to earn respect,
I look forward to that happy day when the popular expression will be a new and
widely recognized truism: "As Ethical as a Judge."
20. "Lewis all the while, either by the Strength of his Brain, or Flinching his Glass, kept
himself sober as a Judge." JOHN ARBUTHNOT, Law is a Bottomless Pit, in THE HISTORY OF JOHN
BULL 5, 58 (Alan W. Bower & Robert A. Erickson eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1712) (part 3,
ch. 6).
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